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I AM A VICTIM TOO: APPLYING THE “DUAL VICTIMOFFENDER” FRAMEWORK TO REFORM NEW YORK’S
FAMILY COURT
Nikki Whetstone*
INTRODUCTION
New York has two separate judicial systems within Family Court: one
for children who are considered “victims,” and another for those who are
considered “offenders.” Children whose parents are suspected of
abuse/neglect are placed in dependency court, under the guise that the state
must step in as parens patriae to protect the well-being of the child.1 On the
other hand, children who are accused of committing a crime are placed in
delinquency court, with the purpose of protecting society and holding the
youth accountable for their actions, while also attempting to rehabilitate
them.2 However, often the same social and familial circumstances lead
children to become involved in both systems, simultaneously yet separately
becoming both the “victim” and the “offender” in the eyes of the court.
Despite recent efforts to reform the family court system, New York fails to
address the needs of youth who are involved in both delinquency and
dependency court.
This paper first examines the separate theoretical and historical
foundations of both New York dependency and delinquency court,
including their differing rationales and treatment of children. Part II of this
*

Nikki received her B.A. from Temple University in 2011 and her J.D. from CUNY
School of Law in 2015. She currently lives in Pittsburgh, PA and is a licensed attorney in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania focusing on family law and child advocacy. Nikki
would like to thank her husband, Eric Whetstone, and CUNY Law Professor Ann Cammett
for their overwhelming support, encouragement, and guidance.
1
See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2015).
2
See generally FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1.
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paper evaluates the correlation between victimization and offending, and the
connection between dependent youth and their subsequent involvement in
the delinquency system (“dual-status youth”). Finally, part III explores the
“dual victim-offender” framework and offers this as a lens to be used by
Family Court to inform their view of children and, in turn, reform the way
children are treated in the system.
I.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF CHILDREN AND THE COURT SYSTEM
A.

Delinquency Court

The concept of “delinquency” was not established in New York until
1909.3 Prior to that, New York followed common law principles of criminal
responsibility and tried all defendants in criminal court regardless of age.4
Children aged 16 and older were considered adults and tried in criminal
court.5 In addition, children aged 7–14 also could be tried as an adult in
criminal court as long as the state demonstrated “beyond all doubt and
contradiction” that the child knew the difference between “good and evil”
and understood the consequences of their actions.6 Conviction resulted in
the child being placed in an adult prison to serve his or her sentence.
In the early-to-mid 19th century, the children’s rights movement began
to gain momentum in the United States.7 The movement’s 20th century
accomplishments included federal maternity and infancy health programs,8
the enactment of child labor laws,9 and the establishment of public benefit
programs10 to help alleviate the rampant effects of poverty on children.11
3

MERRIL SOBIE & GARY SOLOMON, 10 NEW YORK FAMILY COURT PRACTICE § 10:1
(2d ed. 2015).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See id.
8
See generally Maternity and Infancy (Sheppard-Towner) Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224
(1921) (lapsed 1929).
9
See generally, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-178, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
10
See generally, e.g., Child Nutrition Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-642, § 17, 80 Stat. 885
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1786) (creating the Special Supplemental Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants and Children (“WIC”)); Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74271, §§ 401-406, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (repealed 1996) (creating the Social
Security’s Aid to Dependent Children); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2015) (granting benefits to
children of deceased Social Security beneficiaries).
11
David
Walls,
Children’s
Rights
Movement,
SONOMA ST.
U.,
http://www.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/childrens-rights-movement.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2FTA-UQYB].
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Within this children’s rights movement, advocates also focused on
reforming how the criminal system handled children who committed a
crime.12 Reformers viewed the criminal system, which focused on the
punishment of the defendant, as particularly inadequate in the context of
children-offenders who needed rehabilitation.13 Out of this movement, in
1824, a charitable organization established an alternative placement
program for “juveniles” convicted of a crime.14 Children under the age of
14 were eligible for placement in the New York House of Refuge instead of
a prison sentence.15 Asylums were also established to house very young
children.16
However, despite this rehabilitation movement, children who were sent
to a house of refuge were often placed in a worse situation than those who
were sent to prison or left on the streets.17 Children were placed in a house
of refuge without any formal hearing, conviction or sentence.18 These
houses of refuge had deplorable conditions and often developed into
sweatshops.19 Many children were sent to farms in western United States.20
The horrendous conditions in the houses of refuge and juvenile prisons
led to a second wave of reformation in the mid-to-late 19th century that
sought to establish a better alternative.21 In 1899, Illinois established the
country’s first juvenile court system.22 Shortly thereafter, New York courts
began issuing lesser sentences for juveniles in recognition that children
needed to be treated differently than adults, and the New York Penal Law
was amended to provide courts with the discretion to lower a felony charge
to a misdemeanor for children under the age of 14.23
New York continued to reform the criminal justice system by expanding
the specialized treatment of children and establishing the concept of
“delinquency” with the New York Penal Law of 1909 (“1909 Act”).24 The
12

John P. Woods, New York’s Juvenile Offender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3 (1980).
13
Id.
14
Our City Charities: The New-York House of Refuge for Juvenile Delinquents, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 1860), http://www.nytimes.com/1860/01/23/news/our-city-charities-thenew-york-house-of-refuge-for-juvenile-delinquents.html?pagewanted=all.
15
Woods, supra note 12, at 3.
16
Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney
2015).
17
Woods, supra note 12, at 3-4.
18
Id. at 3
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 4.
23
Id.
24
Woods, supra note 12, at 4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (1909) (now codified at N.Y.
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state established that children under the age of 16 would be classified as
delinquent if they committed an act that would have been deemed a crime if
committed by an adult.25 As such, the delinquent child could not be
convicted of a crime or sent to an adult prison, but would be given a
suspended judgment, probation, or be sent to an institution.26
The 1909 Act is significant in the evolution of delinquency court for
several reasons. First, it announced the framework of this new delinquency
system: to view children as in “need of care and protection of the state” as
opposed to treating the child as the “commission[er] of a crime.”27 In
addition, the 1909 Act incorporated the “best interest of the child” standard
into the disposition of children in the delinquency system.28 The statute
requires the court to “consider the needs and best interests of the respondent
as well as the need for protection of the community.”29
However, all delinquency proceedings remained in criminal court and
were heard by criminal court judges.30 It was not until 1922 that New York
City established the state’s first independent children’s court.31 The
Children’s Court, a division under the Domestic Relations Court, provided a
tribunal for delinquency and dependency proceedings independent from
criminal court.32 The rest of New York State established similar
independent children’s courts; however, the state lacked consistency in
what laws applied to this new court system and how they would be
applied.33
In the years following the establishment of the Children’s Court, courts
struggled with how to treat the children in their system and what rights
children were afforded.34 Courts began treating delinquency proceedings as
distinct from criminal proceedings.35 The court system undertook a
philosophical transformation; courts held that delinquency proceedings
were not part of the criminal system, but rather an informal system with a
quasi-civil component.36 The delinquency system was recognized for its
PENAL LAW §§ 30.0, 70.05 (McKinney 2016)).
25
Woods, supra note 12, at 4.
26
See id. at 4-6.
27
Sobie, supra note 16.
28
Id.
29
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2015).
30
SOBIE & SOLOMON, supra note 3, § 10:1.
31
Sobie, supra note 16.
32
Woods, supra note 12, at 5.
33
Id.
34
SOBIE & SOLOMON, supra note 3, § 10:1.
35
Woods, supra note 12, at 5, 7; Jeffrey A. Butts & Ojmarrh Mitchell, Brick by Brick:
Dismantling the Border Between Juvenile and Adult Justice, 2 CRIM. JUST. 2000 167, 170,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02f2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4Z-S8ZS].
36
Id.
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rehabilitative purpose and developed under the principle of parens patriae:
the state is the “parent” or protector of children who cannot protect
themselves.37 With this foundational change, criminal procedural standards
no longer applied to delinquency proceedings.38
For many years, case law provided the only instruction for the purpose
of delinquency court: to provide guidance and redemption of neglected and
delinquent children.39 In 1962, the Family Court Act (FCA) was passed in
New York providing due process rights to children in delinquency
proceedings.40 In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, which
established that children have a federal constitutional right to due process in
delinquency court.41 The FCA, along with the 1967 decision in In re Gault,
changed the way children were viewed in delinquency court by
reestablishing the procedural due process rights of children.42 This
reestablishment of procedural due process rights resulted in the delinquency
system moving back toward a quasi-criminal system and away from the
parens patriae framework.43
In 1976, the New York Juvenile Justice Reform Act (JJRA) codified the
historical “best interest of the child” purpose of the delinquency court
system, but also added the consideration of “the need for protection of the
community.”44 This addition created a divide in how courts reconciled the
two competing considerations. In 1979, three cases interpreted this purpose
clause and the history of the delinquency system differently. The court in
People v. Young determined that the JJRA codified the long-standing best
interest purpose of delinquency court, but also changed the purpose by
adding a secondary consideration in the protection of the community.45
While the court in In re Rudy S. agreed with the Young court regarding the
best interest consideration, it held that this dual purpose had been longstanding in the history of delinquency court.46 The court in Rudy S. asserted
that the protection of the community had been part of the delinquency
court’s purpose since its inception, and the JJRA merely codified it.47 Either
way, the JJRA is problematic for forcing courts to look at and weigh this
37

See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177 (1932).
Id.
39
Id.
40
Sobie, supra note 16.
41
See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42
Sobie, supra note 16.
43
Id.
44
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, ch. 878, 1976 N.Y. Laws § 2 (codified at N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2015)).
45
People v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 328, 330 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., Monroe Cty., 1979).
46
In re Rudy S., 100 Misc. 2d 1112, 1119 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., Richmond Cty., 1979).
47
See id.
38
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secondary interest in the protection of the public, as it can prevent the courts
from acting in the child’s best interest.
On the other hand, the court in In re Elizabeth J. interpreted the statute
as requiring the court to look at the best interest and needs of the child
throughout the entire delinquency process, while additionally weighing the
protection of the community only during the dispositional phase.48 This
interpretation assumes that a disposition based solely on the needs and best
interest of the child does not adequately protect the community. However,
this reasoning is flawed; acting in the child’s best interest to ensure the best
possible outcome for that youth will, in turn, also protect the community. It
is never in the child’s best interest to place them in a position where they
will reoffend. Despite the codified definition of the delinquency court’s
purpose in the JJRA, the varying interpretations of the definition which are
found in Young, Rudy S., and Elizabeth J. demonstrate that there is still
ambiguity and confusion regarding how the courts are to decide
delinquency cases.
Almost thirty years after the JJRA codified the delinquency court’s
purpose, the court in In re Robert J. rearticulated this purpose: “to empower
Family Court to intervene and positively impact the lives of troubled young
people while protecting the public.”49 That court maintained the
problematic dual purpose of delinquency court and failed to clarify their
relationship.50 As evidenced by the courts’ varying interpretations, it is
unclear how the two competing delinquency court purposes are to be
weighed and applied.
States began adopting harsher treatment of youth in the 1990s as a result
of an unfounded criminology theory of the “superpredator.”51 This theory
hypothesized that the United States would see a dramatic increase in violent
crimes committed by youth in the coming decade.52 Proponent of the
“superpredator” theory, John DiIulio, announced a “new breed of children”
who are “so impulsive, so remorseless, that [they] can kill, rape, maim,
without giving it a second thought.”53 Due to the perpetuation of this
hysteria by criminologists and politicians, youth became increasingly
stigmatized and a generalized fear grew in communities across the
country.54 States, including New York, responded by increasing enumerated
offenses and lowering age requirements of transfer laws, as well as
48

In re Elizabeth J., 98 Misc. 2d 362, 363-65 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., N.Y. Cty., 1979).
In re Robert J., 2 N.Y.3d 339, 346 (2004).
50
Id.
51
Editorial Board, Echoes of the Superpredator, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/echoes-of-the-superpredator.html?_r=0.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
49
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mandating harsher sentences.55
This theory of the “superpredator” was wholly disproved when studies
concluded that youth offenses, including violent crimes, decreased from
1993 to 1997.56 In 2001, Mr. DiIulio admitted that the “superpredator”
theory was completely false, stating, “If I knew then what I know now, I
would have shouted for prevention of crimes.”57 Unfortunately, most of the
harsh laws enacted during the 1990s in New York remain in effect today
despite the debunking of the “superpredator” theory.58
There has been a recent effort in New York to reform juvenile justice
laws. There is currently a “Raise the Age” campaign to raise the age
requirement for criminal prosecution from 16 years of age.59 A bill was
proposed in the New York Assembly which would have raised the
jurisdictional age to 18 by amending or repealing portions of New York
penal law, executive law, criminal procedure law, and the FCA.60 The
purpose of this bill acknowledged several fundamental principles of
juvenile justice, including the need for children to be treated in an ageappropriate manner, and that juvenile incarceration has not been effective in
the deterrence or prevention of crimes.61 However, this bill never made it
out of committee.62
Despite these recent reform efforts, the harsh laws initiated during the
1990s “superpredator” era are still in place.63 In addition, the courts have
failed to reconcile the two competing purposes of acting in the child’s best
interest and protecting the community. The delinquency system retains a
problematic foundation which jeopardizes the well-being of its children.

55

Id.
MICHAEL BOCHENEK, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO MINOR MATTER: CHILDREN IN
MARYLAND’S JAILS (1999), http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland02.htm#P359_42894 [https://perma.cc/7JCX-Y236].
57
Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theoriston-young-superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html.
58
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(1) (McKinney 2015) (enumerating offenses for
which thirteen, fourteen and fifteen-year-olds can be tried as adults); see also N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.91 (McKinney 2015) (enumerating sexual offenses for which thirteen, fourteen,
and fifteen-year-olds can be tried as adults); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 2015)
(providing guidelines for sentencing juveniles as adults).
59
RAISE THE AGE N.Y., http://raisetheageny.com [https://perma.cc/FKA8-XHCB].
60
A.B. 3668, 200th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2013).
61
Id.
62
New York Assembly Bill 3668, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/NY/bill/A03668/2013 [https://perma.cc/WRC9-6LRE].
63
Echoes of the Superpredator, supra note 51.
56
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Dependency Court

Until the mid-1800s, children who were abused or neglected were
treated the same as delinquent children.64 These dependent children were
placed in poorhouses, large orphan asylums, and refuge houses alongside
delinquent children.65 New York had abuse and neglect laws that prohibited
the use of excess corporal punishment and allowed the court to remove
abused/neglected children from their caregiver.66 However, these laws were
rarely enforced.67 Society in the United States at this time generally viewed
children as the property of the father.68 Courts held that a husband was
legally permitted to physically punish his wife and children because he was
legally responsible for their actions.69 Parents had sole control and
discretion over their children, who were also deemed their parents’
property.70 As such, abuse and neglect laws were very rarely utilized, except
in extreme situations.71 These abuse/neglect laws were generally used to
intervene in the lives of poor families where the child was deemed predelinquent due to the conduct of the child or the parent.72 For example,
these laws were used to remove children from a parent due to substance
abuse, criminal conduct, or “other vices” because it exposed the child to an
“idle and dissolute life.”73
Child protection laws evolved and expanded throughout the 19th
century.74 Ex parte Crouse75 was the first case to establish the court’s role
64

See William Wesley Patton, Child Protective Services – Historical Overview,
Current System, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM,
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1828/Child-Protective-Services.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZD8-6ENY].
65
Id.
66
MARVIN VENTRELL, EVOLUTION OF THE DEPENDENCY COMPONENT OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 11 (1998),
http://www.juvenilelawsociety.org/upload/evolutionofthedependencycour.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SW5F-PYZP].
67
Id. at 16-17.
68
See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 121,
122 (1994).
69
See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 156-57 (1824).
70
VENTRELL, supra note 66, at 6.
71
See John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q.
449, 450 (2008).
72
Id. at 450-51.
73
Id. at 450.
74
See Mary Ellen Wilson, AM. HUMANE ASS’N,
http://www.americanhumane.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/mary-ellen-wilson.html
[https://perma.cc/FP9C-E5UZ]. This movement began with the case of Mary Ellen Wilson.
Id.
75
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
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as parens patriae in cases of abuse/neglect.76 The court held that when a
parent fails to adequately care for their child, the state has the duty to
protect the child by intervening in the family, including the right to remove
the child and step into care for him/her.77 In 1875, the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) was founded in New York as a
private organization to enforce child protection laws.78 The city contracted
with the SPCC to investigate and prosecute abuse/neglect claims, and to
remove and place abused/neglected children.79
It was not until the 1960s with the passing of the FCA and the In re
Gault decision that dependent children were distinguished from delinquent
children in the court system. In re Gault’s holding that children in
delinquency proceedings had a right to due process80 simultaneously
cemented the fact that dependent children did not have such a right. As
such, dependency court, a court deeply founded in the principle of parens
patriae, was formally separated from delinquency court. In addition, the
FCA refocused child protection laws and enforcement on parental acts of
abuse and neglect as opposed to economic conditions.81
NY FCA § 1011 established the purpose of dependency court: to “help
protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their
physical, mental, and emotional well-being.”82 Dependency court permits
the state to “intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so
that his needs are properly met.”83 Most dependency cases begin with a
Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation and report of suspected
abuse/neglect under NY Social Services Law § 413. Under NY Social
Services Law § 411, the purpose of CPS is to protect abused or maltreated
children “from further injury and impairment” as well as to provide
“rehabilitative services for the child or children and parents involved.”84
New York’s statutory law puts forth the view that abused and maltreated
children are “victims” in need of protection and that the role of dependency
court is as parens patriae. Dependency court’s purpose focuses solely on
76

VENTRELL, supra note 66, at 14.
Id.; Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 10.
78
N.Y. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN,
http://www.nyspcc.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
79
Patton, supra note 64.
80
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
81
See, e.g., Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011
(McKinney 2015) (defining the purpose of dependency court to protect children from
“injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing”); Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 2015)
(establishing grounds for permanent neglect).
82
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2015).
83
Id.
84
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 2015).
77
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the wellbeing of the child. This differs significantly from the delinquency
court’s purpose which must balance the wellbeing of the child against the
needs of the community.85
II.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENCY AND DELINQUENCY
A. The “Victim-Offender Overlap”

Many studies have been conducted over the years analyzing what
circumstances lead an individual to become a victim or perpetrator of crime.
“Criminology” uses a multidisciplinary approach to explain the causes of
criminal behavior and how to prevent criminal behavior in society.86 On the
other hand, “victimology” attempts to explain who generally becomes a
victim of a crime and why, as well as the psychological effects of such
victimization on the victim.87 Until relatively recently, victimology was a
subcategory of criminology and lacked much evidential study.88 It was not
until the mid-20th century when criminologists began comparing the
characteristics and experiences of offenders and victims that they
discovered the “victim-offender overlap.”89
The National Crime Survey (NCS) (a self-reporting victimization
survey) became a prominent source for this information in the 1970s.90
These surveys completely changed the views of criminologists regarding
who was considered the typical “victim” and “offender.”91 Prior to these
studies, criminologists generally posited the typical victim as the “white
middle-aged woman” and the typical offender as the “unmarried young
black man.”92 The surveys revealed that the same demographic group that
was viewed as the typical offender, i.e., unmarried young black men, was
also the same demographic that predicted the highest likelihood of
victimization.93 Further research revealed that offenders and victims shared
many of the same life experiences.94 This “victim-offender overlap”
85

See infra Part III.
See Chad Posick, UNTANGLING OFFENDING AND VICTIMIZATION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE VICTIM-OFFENDER OVERLAP 21 (2013),
https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/downloads/neu:2467?datastream_id=content
[https://perma.cc/B2GG-XA7C].
87
See id. at 22.
88
Id. at 22-23.
89
Id. at 27.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 24-25.
93
See id. at 26.
94
Id. at 27.
86
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discovery, that the same factors generally predict both victimization and
offending, revolutionized how criminologists viewed the typical victim and
offender. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, which
highlighted the importance of these studies, provided “an accurate picture of
juvenile offending and victimization risk is integral to a strategy to decrease
violence.”95
The development of the “victim-offender overlap” led many social
scientists to begin studying criminology and victimology together in the
hopes of developing a unified theory of predicting who is likely to be an
offender or a victim.96 From this, they discovered that victims and offenders
are often one and the same.97 This led to the development of the “cycle of
violence”, the theory that “violence begets violence.”98 This theory holds
that those who are victims of violence (whether by direct or vicarious
trauma) are more likely to become perpetrators of violence, and vice
versa.99 Specifically, the “cycle of violence” theory found a link between
victimization through childhood/adolescent maltreatment and later
becoming an offender.100
In 1978, the New York State Assembly’s Select Committee on Child
Abuse issued a “Summary Report on the Relationship Between Child
Abuse and Neglect and Later Socially Deviant Behavior.”101 This report
came out of the Committee’s investigation into the administrative and
legislative shortcomings of New York’s child protective system. In its
investigation, those in the child protective field brought to light the “social
cost” of child maltreatment—that the same children who were declared
dependent due to abuse/neglect were later becoming involved in the
delinquency system.102
Judge Nanette Dembitz of the New York City Family Court testified,
“the root of crime in the streets is the neglect of children.”103 At the time of
95

Id. at 25 (citing Rolf Loeber et al., Juvenile Delinquency and Serious Injury
Victimization, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Aug. 2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/188676.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z92S-NFK7]).
96
G.C. Curtis, Violence Breeds Violence—Perhaps?, 120 Am. J. Psychiatry 386, 38687 (1963).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
JOSE D. ALFARO, N.Y. STATE ASSEMB. SELECT COMM. ON CHILD ABUSE,
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND
LATER SOCIALLY DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1978),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/50515NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ASEEFPZ].
102
See id. at 11.
103
Id. at 2.
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the report, there were very few, if any, empirical studies relating to the
correlation between child maltreatment and delinquency. However, this
investigation announced a “definite relationship between child maltreatment
and juvenile misbehaviour and criminality.”104 Specifically, the Committee
found that delinquency occurred at a higher rate among families who had a
reported history of abuse/neglect than among those in the same community
who did not have such a history.105 The report also found that an
abused/neglected child was up to five times more likely to be found
delinquent or ungovernable than a child in the general population.106
Many studies conducted since the 1990s have validated the connection
between victimization through child abuse/neglect and a heightened
likelihood of becoming a juvenile delinquent or adult criminal offender.107
In 1994, the National Institute of Justice completed a study on the “cycle of
violence,” specifically focusing on the link between child abuse/neglect and
criminal behavior.108 The study, which followed over 1,500 children for
twenty-seven years, determined that children who had a substantiated case
of abuse/neglect in dependency court were 59% more likely to be arrested
as a juvenile delinquent, 28% more likely to be arrested as an adult, and
30% more likely to be arrested for a violent crime.109 Therefore, the study
suggests that not only does “violence beget violence,” but also child
maltreatment of any kind (including both neglect and abuse) begets
violence.110 Another study found that, while children of parents who were
physically abused had the same likelihood of being abused as the general
population, children of parents who were neglected or sexually abused were
twice as likely to suffer the same abuse.111
In 2005, a study found that, controlling for socio-demographic
characteristics and prior delinquent behavior, maltreated children (including
both abuse and neglect) were more than twice as likely to be arrested,
commit a general offense, commit a violent offense, and use drugs through
104
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early adulthood than those who were not maltreated.112 While historically
neglect has not been studied with regard to its impact on the delinquency of
youth,113 this study demonstrated that it in fact has a comparative effect to
abuse.114 In addition, while neglect has its highest impact on delinquency in
late adolescence, the negative effect of other types of abuse, such as sexual
abuse, tends to manifest later in adulthood.115
Therefore, these studies show a correlation between, not only
victimization and criminal perpetration, but also specifically neglect/abuse
and delinquency. The current binary court system does not take into account
the causal connection between dependency and delinquency nor does it
adequately address the needs of these children to prevent a continuation of
the cycle of violence.
III.

APPLYING A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE FAMILY COURT
SYSTEM

The current family court system must be altered to account for the
causal connection between dependency and delinquency in order to provide
adequate services to children involved in these systems. Firstly, it is
important to establish both a language and system that appropriately
identifies children involved in both systems so that their specific needs can
be met. In addition, a new framework must be used to view children in the
dependency and delinquency systems and the role of the court in order to
establish the necessary reforms.
A.

“Dual Status” Youth

The RFK National Resource Center for Juvenile Justice (“the Center”),
founded in Boston in 2004, has recently developed new language to
enhance discussions surrounding issues relating to youth who have been
involved with both dependency and delinquency court.116 The Center
defines the term “dual status youth.”117 In addition to this general term of
112
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“dual status youth,” the Center encourages distinction between different
levels of involvement in the dependency and delinquency courts to reform
these systems to better meet the needs of youth by developing more specific
terms. Under the Center’s terminology, “dually identified youth” are those
who were previously involved in the dependency system and who are
currently involved in the delinquency system.118 “Dually involved youth”
are those who are currently involved in both systems.119 Finally, “dually
adjudicated youth” are those who have had both a finding of neglect in
dependency court and a finding of delinquency in the juvenile justice
system.120
This newly-developed terminology is important to the reformation of
the dependency and delinquency systems. It forces society to become
conscious of this specific category of youth and the issues pertaining to
them. While the correlation between dependency and delinquency has been
established for decades, dual status youth, and the issues they face, are
addressed independently by each system. This terminology would provide
courts with the tools necessary to effectively discuss the issues pertaining to
these youth and develop a cohesive plan in addressing them. It would assist
jurisdictions in looking at dual status youth in a holistic manner and in
developing a new area of law that directly focuses on them.
B.

The “Dual Victim-Offender” Framework

In addition to implementing new terminology, it is also important to
develop a new theoretical framework for addressing the issues of dual status
youth. The current methods for dealing with delinquent youth are faulty.
The delinquency system has had severe issues in both shaping its
goals/premise and in its implementation.121 The delinquency system’s
history shows that there is a serious tension in balancing its goals of acting
in the child’s best interest while simultaneously acting to protect society.
This has manifested in a tension of whether the delinquency system should
be punishment-based or rehabilitative.122 In addition, over the past several
centuries, the delinquency system has failed to successfully implement its
policy goals, specifically in protecting youth. In many instances, the
delinquency system has placed children in far worse conditions than they
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were previously in.123
It is crucial for delinquency courts to view youth not simply as
“perpetrators,” but as whole individuals with a history of victimization and
trauma. In “The ‘Monster’ in All of Us: When Victims Become
Perpetrators,” Abbe Smith presents the life of Aileen Wuornos to criticize
the dichotomy of the “victim” and “perpetrator” labels.124 Wuornos suffered
severe physical and sexual abuse and neglect during her life.125 She engaged
in sex work when she was a teenager, and eventually was convicted of
killing seven men who were her clients.126 Smith’s article challenges the
view that “there is a great divide between people to whom terrible things are
done and people who do terrible things.”127 Smith states, “It is the rare
perpetrator who has not also suffered.”128 She argues that the criminal
justice system often embraces victims and then shuns those same
individuals when they become perpetrators.129 She criticizes victim
advocates and supporters who “abandon them [victims] when they repeat
the behavior by acting out against others.”130 Ultimately, Smith argues for
prosecutors to make “these critical connections” between victim and
perpetrator.131 In the same way that Smith applies this “dual victimoffender” framework to Aileen Wuornos, this framework needs to be
applied to dual status youth. Without this comprehensive understanding, the
state’s use of punitive measures while ignoring preventive and rehabilitative
measures perpetuates the “cycle of violence.” This framework needs to be
used in the context of dual status youth to inform the reformations
necessary to both dependency and delinquency systems to provide a holistic
response to the needs of these youth.
C.

Reforming the Dependency and Delinquency Systems

Applying the dual victim-offender framework to dual status youth
would lead to an entire restructuring of the family court system. Currently,
the dependency and delinquency court systems are diametrically opposed;
the same youth is viewed in one context solely as a “victim” and in the
other context solely as an “offender,” despite the known close relationship
123
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between the two. The dual victim-offender framework shows that the court
system needs to be structured so as to effectively treat a youth’s
involvement in both systems, acknowledging the “critical connections”
between the two.132 As such, the dependency and delinquency court systems
should be united under one court system utilizing the same service
providers and workers on an individual case to ensure a cohesive and
holistic plan for dual status youth.
Perhaps most importantly, this unified system must encompass the dual
victim-offender framework in its purpose. This new system must act with
the sole purpose of advancing the best interest of the child. The balance of
the interests of the child against the perceived safety concerns of society
needs to be eliminated. The best interest of the child will be advanced and
any concerns for the safety/protection of the public will be adequately
addressed if the courts focus on rehabilitation.
Until a new uniform system is introduced, it is important for the records
of dual status youth to be shared between all providers and parties in both
the dependency and delinquency systems. While there are confidentiality
laws in place to protect subject youth under NY SSL § 442-a, such laws
must be amended to clearly permit the sharing of information between
dependency and delinquency in order to effectuate a holistic approach in the
cases of dual status youth. Even in circumstances where disclosure is
permitted, parties involved in the cases are often unwilling to share
information in fear of violating the confidentiality statute.133 Therefore, not
only must the statute clearly permit such disclosure, but all workers on the
case must also be accurately informed of the law to ensure communication
among all parties in both systems.
In addition to sharing information and records for those youth already
involved in both systems, it is important that youth at risk of becoming dual
status are identified when they first enter the system in order for the family
to receive preventive services. The 1978 Summary Report concluded that
the state needed to address the drastic lack of rehabilitative services
provided to families involved in dependency court in order to counteract the
negative effects of the abuse/neglect.134 The Committee records stated, “If
we do not help children in trouble, they will grow up to make trouble.”135
Nearly 30 years later, the 2005 study on the correlation between
dependency and delinquency similarly argued for strengthened preventive
and rehabilitative services for families dealing with abuse/neglect.136
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Several studies have determined that early intervention in the lives of atrisk families has reduced both child abuse/neglect and future
delinquency.137 Such services include nurse home visits for at-risk pregnant
women, parent skills training, health screenings, abuse screenings, and other
various social services.138 Despite the strong evidence of a correlation
between dependency and delinquency, both court systems fail to currently
provide adequate preventive resources for families involved in the court
system. Therefore, it is imperative not only to identify children at risk of
becoming dual status early, but also to make preventive and early
intervention resources available to their families.
Unfortunately, because these reforms will initially require a significant
monetary investment and the culture of the courts currently value punitive
measures over rehabilitation, these reforms will meet resistance.
Nevertheless, such measures must be adopted to provide adequate services
to children involved in the systems.
CONCLUSION
The delinquency court system developed out of a recognition that
children should be treated differently than adults. Delinquency court
evolved over the following decades to act as parens patriae in the best
interest of the child. However, this simultaneously resulted in a loss of
children’s procedural due process rights. Eventually, the JJRA and In re
Gault reestablished these rights for children while adding a second
consideration of the protection of the community to the delinquency court’s
purpose. This tension in purposes often results in the punitive treatment of
children found to be delinquent, jeopardizing their best interest.
Historically, dependent children were not distinguished from those who
were delinquent in the eyes of the court and both were sent to an asylum or
house of refuge. Eventually, the dependency court system was established
separate from delinquency court with the purpose of protecting children in
cases where their parents failed to do so.
The maintenance of separate family court systems ignores the causal
connection between dependency and delinquency. Children who are the
subject of abuse and neglect are more likely to later become perpetrators of
violence. The current family court system fails to acknowledge this
137
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connection and perpetuates the cycle of violence by imposing punitive
measures in delinquency court. The family court system must implement a
new “dual victim-offender” framework to change the way it views and
treats its children. This framework would require the courts to view
delinquency as a product of past trauma and violence and treat dual status
children in a holistic manner. In addition, the courts must also provide
social services to families in dependency court to prevent the initiation of
this cycle. The “dual victim-offender” framework must be implemented in
the court system to ensure that dependent and delinquent children receive
appropriate services.
***

